

CPYRGHT.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIND. 718,167
S. 702,577

FEB 20 1966

CPYRGHT

also in
St. Louis
Globe Democrat
March 1, 1966

Between the Lines

Russia's Role in Viet Nam

Soviet Involvement Downgraded by 'Faceless Men'

Washington — Washington is placing practically exclusive emphasis on Red China as the major outside influence in the Viet Nam war. This flies in the face of repeated avowals by the USSR and evidence that it is providing the sinews and the brains for what it calls a "liberation war" in Viet Nam. In its public releases, the State Department either ignores Soviet Russia's massive involvement in the war or plays down its significance.

The extent of Soviet aid has been publicly admitted by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee. He has warned that Soviet Russia will not allow the United States to achieve its goals in Viet Nam. In a speech before the plenary meeting of the Central Committee last Sept. 29, he said:

"We have already delivered and are delivering to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, a considerable amount of weapons and military equipment. Our policy is to continue to deliver it every assistance, both material and political which it will need to repulse U. S. aggression."

Soviet Equipment

The Soviets are doing just that. Soviet and Czech-made antiaircraft artillery is taking a heavy toll of American planes flying over targets in North Viet Nam. Soviet bloc ships are undeterred as they carry thousands of tons of military and paramilitary equipment into the port of Haiphong.

The reason Washington is playing down Moscow's role in the Viet Nam war should be obvious. It would embarrass our policy of "building bridges" — increasing East-



Roosevelt

By
EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT

State for Economic Affairs, said in Dallas on Oct. 21, that Congress would be asked to "examine recommendations for changes in East-West trade policy." This implied an increase of our trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites, enabling them to increase their military aid to Viet Nam!

The 'Justification'

The official justification for this is to be found in what are called "National Intelligence Estimates." These reflect the State Department theory that Soviet Russia is "mellowing" and is not a threat to U. S. security. An intelligence estimate is a judgment regarding the probability of future political and military developments by our intelligence complex. Periodically, staff men on CIA's board of national estimates produce papers intended to evaluate the intentions and capabilities of Communist countries.

The President and his Cabinet use these as a basis for policy formulation, dealing with the budget, military research and development, weapons procurement and the size of our military forces. These estimates are also largely used to set U. S. policy in regard to trade with the Soviet bloc.

Provided Rationale

Since World War II, these estimates have provided the rationale for export to Moscow of supplies and equipment that the Soviets vitally need for their military buildup. The estimates pictured a Soviet bloc capable of meeting the bulk of its requirements.

In 1954, distorted intelligence estimates were used to justify deleting or downgrading some 77 categories of machine tools from the Battle Act list which barred their shipment behind the Iron Curtain. According to the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, former deputy director for In-

telligence production, said his agency accepted the accuracy of Soviet production figures for machine tools. Yet Soviet statistics are notoriously misleading and wholly unreliable, a fact frequently admitted by Soviet officials. Amory's statement can be found on Pages 306 and 307 of the subcommittee hearing report entitled "Export of Strategic Materials to the USSR and other Soviet Bloc Countries," Part 2, Oct. 24, 1961.

Faulty Evaluation

Our government's inflated evaluation of the Soviet economy became so widely known that it was finally contradicted by the CIA in its published report of Jan. 9, 1964, and by a State Department report last September. By that time, as usual, the damage had already been done. For nearly a decade, critical intelligence facts pointing to glaring gaps in the Soviet economy were either overlooked or deliberately ignored.

Thus, we were prevented from exploiting what could have been crippling weaknesses in the USSR's capacity for fostering "liberation wars." At the same time, we set the example for England and others of our allies to furnish the items the Reds critically needed on the grounds that these were not strategic any longer since the Soviets were capable of manufacturing them anyway.

Today, Amory is no longer in government. This is irrelevant. The same small group of "faceless men" is directing the drive for more East-West trade, dovetailing into Moscow's propaganda campaign with the same objective.